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Abstract
Welfare-state measures often tend to persist even when they
seem to have become suboptimal due to changes in the economic
environment. This paper proposes an information-based expla-
nation for this welfare-state persistence. I present a structural
model where rationally inattentive voters decide upon implemen-
tations and removals of social insurance. In this model, welfare-
state persistence arises from disincentive e¤ects of social insur-
ance on attentiveness. The welfare state crowds out private nan-
cial precautions and with it agentsattentiveness to changes in
economic fundamentals. When welfare-state arrangements are
pronounced, agents realize changes in economic fundamentals
later and reforms have considerable delays.
Keywords: welfare state, voting, imperfect information
JEL classication: D72, H55, D83
1 Introduction
It is a frequently expressed view that the political process features
an asymmetry between the speed of implementations of welfare-state
arrangements and the speed of their removals. Reforms enhancing the
size of the welfare state seem easily and quickly implemented while oppo-
site reforms face stronger opposition. Welfare-state measures thus tend
Mail: christian.bredemeier@tu-dortmund.de. This research is part of SFB 823,
project A4.
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to persist. This paper o¤ers an information-based explanation for this
welfare-state persistence.
Many authors agree that the welfare state is persistent. For example,
Lindbeck (2003) observes "certain asymmetries between the politics of
expansion and retreat" in welfare-state dynamics. Hassler et al. (2003)
emphasize that, in the US, the UK, France, and Italy, the great depres-
sion led to increased public intervention which did not diminish after the
economies had recovered. Brooks and Manza (2006) nd similar patterns
in welfare-state dynamics of several OECD countries at the end of the
twentieth century and summarize that "welfare states within most de-
veloped democracies appear quite resilient in the face of profound shifts
in their national settings." Welfare-state persistence is further observed
by e.g. Gavin and Perotti (1997), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Ag-
ell (2002), Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004), Beetsma et al. (2009),
Balassone et al. (2010), and Brügemann (2012).
This paper o¤ers an explanation for welfare-state persistence which
is based on the e¤ects of the welfare state on attentiveness. Since the
welfare state crowds out private nancial precautions, it also reduces
incentives to inform oneself about economic fundamentals such as life
expectancy or invalidity risk. These fundamentals do not only inuence
private decisions on savings or insurance but also determine the optimal
social choice regarding welfare-state arrangements.
The frequency with which people inform themselves about funda-
mentals depends on their level of private nancial precaution and the
incentives for private precaution depend on welfare-state arrangements.
If the degree of social insurance is high, people engage little in private
nancial activity such as savings. Therefore, they also inform them-
selves rarely about fundamentals. Consequently, if initial welfare-state
arrangements are pronounced, it takes relatively long until a change in
fundamentals is noticed by a majority of society and translated into ap-
propriate policies. By contrast, the political delay is short when initial
welfare-state arrangements are weak.
This reasoning relies on the presence of information costs. The im-
portance of such costs in democratic decision making has been stressed
by Downs (1957). Downs pointed out that even small information costs
can lead voters to be rationally ignorant and cause pronounced uncer-
tainty about relevant political issues since the importance of any indi-
vidual vote is negligible. This point is taken up by e.g. Roemer (1994),
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Cukierman and Tommasi (1998), Myerson (1998), Schultz (2002), and
Taylor and Yildirim (2010) who work with the assumption that voters
are imperfectly informed about the state of the world or the working
of the economy. Empirical support for this form of imperfect informa-
tion of voters is provided by e.g. Haller and Norpoth (1994), Bartels
(1996), Nannestad and Paldam (1997), Duch et al. (2000), De Boef and
Kellstedt (2004), and Duch and Stevenson (2011).
In the model presented in this paper, agents are rationally inattentive
(Reis 2006a; Reis 2006b) and decide on the timing of their infrequent
and costly acquirement of perfect information. Empirical support for the
inattentiveness hypothesis is provided by Lusardi (1999), Ameriks et al.
(2003), Carroll (2003) and Mankiw et al. (2003). Agents have no incen-
tive to inform themselves for political purposes because their individual
impact on social choices is negligible. However, agents seek information
about fundamentals in order to improve their private decisions which
are, in turn, a¤ected by social choices.
Agents in the model have an uncertain income stream and decide
on savings. Due to the absence of a private insurance market, there is
a precautionary motive for savings. Agents face a risk of receiving no
market income in future periods and this risk is a stochastic fundamen-
tal which determines optimal savings. In the political process, agents
decide whether to vote in favor of a social insurance. Agents are ex ante
identical such that there is no distributional motive of social insurance.
However, there is potential demand for social insurance since agents have
no access to a private insurance market. The stochastic income risk is
hence also a determinant of the optimal social choice.
Informing oneself about income risk thus improves both the savings
and the voting decision but agents only value the private benet of im-
proved savings and do not internalize the social benet of their atten-
tiveness. Thus, the information choice is only a¤ected by the incentives
for private savings which are weakened by social insurance.
The model economy shifts between two aggregate states of the world
with di¤erent levels of income risk. I analyze situations where social
insurance is socially benecial in only one of the two states. When
agents believe this one to be the current state of the world, they vote
in favor of social insurance and implement it. When social insurance is
implemented, private savings are lower and, consequently, agents remain
inattentive for longer periods of time. As a result, the removal of social
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insurance when a change in the state of the world has made it suboptimal
takes, in expectation, longer than the implementation of social insurance
after an opposite change in fundamentals.
The key mechanism of this paper relies on the negative e¤ect of social
insurance on agentsprivate nancial precaution, their attentiveness and
thus their knowledge about economic fundamentals. The crowding-out
e¤ects of social insurance with respect to private nancial precaution
have been modeled by e.g. Rust and Phelan (1997) and documented
empirically by Bird (2001). The negative e¤ect of social insurance on
economic knowledge is documented empirically by Jappelli (2010).
Under perfect information, previous explanations have attributed
welfare-state persistence to changes in preferences or in the distribu-
tional conict. In the former argument, pro-work attitudes erode when
more agents live out of benets (Lindbeck 1995; Lindbeck and Weibull
1999; Brooks and Manza 2006). The latter argument stresses that the
welfare-state produces its own support by enforcing distributional con-
icts (Bénabou 2000; Agell 2002; Hassler et al. 2003; Beetsma et al.
2009) or by generating a group of beneciaries who would else not exist
(Saint-Paul 2002; Brügemann 2012). In my model, preferences are stable
and there is no distributional conict since agents are ex-ante identical.
The disincentive e¤ects of social insurance on attentiveness are a thus
a complementary explanation for welfare-state persistence enforcing the
e¤ects of changes in preferences or distributional conicts.
Previous papers on voting over welfare-state measures under un-
certainty have worked with a given information structure. For exam-
ple, Dhami (2003) analyzes voting on redistribution in a representa-
tive democracy with asymmetric information. Laslier et al. (2003) and
Hansen (2005) study majority-voting models of redistribution with im-
perfect information. In Dhami (2003) and Hansen (2005), the informa-
tion structure is exogenously given, while, in Laslier et al. (2003), it
is endogenous but taken as given by agents. By contrast, in the model
presented in this paper, agents face an active information choice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the set-up of the model. In Section 3, the model is solved for individual
decisions of agents. Section 4 describes the aggregate dynamics of the
model. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Model Set-up
I consider an endowment economy with uncertain income that is sub-
ject to two frictions. First, information is only available at a cost such
that agents will rationalize on information. Second, there is a lack of a
private insurance market such that there is a precautionary motive for
savings and, in principle, demand for distortionary social insurance. In
the political process, agents balance expected costs and benets of social
insurance based on their potentially imperfect information.
The economy which is populated by a mass-1 continuum of dynasties.
A dynasty consists of an innite stream of agents who live for two periods
each. Each dynasty has one member in each generation. Generations
are linked through the transmission of information. Specically, each
agent receives all her dynastys information at the beginning of her life.1
Thus, each generation t consists of a mass-1 continuum of agents who
live for two periods, t and t+ 1. Agents maximize
Ei;t [Ui;t] = Ei;t [u (ci;t;t) + u (ci;t;t+1)    di;t] , (1)
where Ui;t is the lifetime utility of agent i in generation t, in short agent
i; t. ci;t;t denotes this agents consumption in period t, and ci;t;t+1 is
consumption of this agent in period t + 1. Ei;t denotes the statistical
expectation operator conditional on information available to agent i; t.
di;t is an indicator variable describing the choice of the agent whether to
be attentive to new information.
 is a xed utility cost of acquiring new information. This can be
understood as the cost of obtaining, processing, and interpreting in-
formation. It may arise because agents nd the process annoying or
frustrating. Reis (2006a) argues that, while some information may be
observed at little cost, the costs of understanding it and determining the
optimal response can be substantial. Likewise, this cost could be mod-
elled as a resource cost capturing e.g. payments to a nancial advisor or
as opportunity costs of time (Sims 2003; Mankiw and Reis 2010).
To ensure analytical tractability, I use linear-quadratic preferences
u (ci;t;t+h) =   ci;t;t+h   (ci;t;t+h)2 , (2)
1In the model, this has the reasonable implication that a generation inherits its
predecessors institutions if not engaging in costly reassessing them.
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where h = 0; 1 and   4.2
Individual uncertainty. In the rst period of their life, agents receive
a deterministic gross income yi;t;t normalized to one,
yi;t;t = 1. (3)
Income in the second period of life is stochastic. With probability 1 t,
a generation-t agent will receive a gross income of 1 also in period t+ 1
(and be called "lucky"). With probability t, agent i of generation t will
receive an income of 0 (and be called "unlucky") in period t+ 1,
yi;t;t+1 =
(
1; prob. 1  t
0; prob. t.
(4)
Aggregate uncertainty. The risk of receiving no income in the sec-
ond period of life, t, follows an exogenous stochastic process. In par-
ticular, t can take two values, h and l, h > l. Thus there are
two states of the world, a "good" one with low income risk and a "bad"
one where income risk is high. State changes occur with an exogenous
probability  < 1
2
in any period. Thus, the stochastic process for  is a
two-state Markov process with transition matrix
 =

1   
 1  

. (5)
Income risk in period t is the same as k periods ago when the number of
state changes between these two periods is even. t is a generation-wide
variable determining the risk for each member of generation t to receive
no income in period t + 1. This risk is the same for all members of the
generation.
For agents, there are two ways to cope with income risk, private (pre-
cautionary) savings and social insurance. There is no private insurance
market. Agents have the possibility to save at a gross interest rate of 1,
2It is common to assume linear, quasi-linear, or linear-quadratic preferences in dy-
namic political-choice models in order to ensure tractability (Tabellini 2000; Hassler
et al. 2003; Borck 2007; Hassler et al. 2007). In this model, the maximal amount of
consumption in a period is 2. Therefore, (2) exhibits positive and decreasing marginal
utility for all relevant levels of consumption.
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i.e. agent i; t can store any amount si;t of her income from period t to pe-
riod t+1. Furthermore, each generation t can decide to implement social
insurance. If so, the government evens out income di¤erences perfectly.
Specically, it collects incomes from all lucky agents and redistributes
incomes equally among the members of the generation. Thus, the con-
tribution of the lucky agents is  t = 1 when there is social insurance. If
a generation decides against social insurance, I will capture this formally
as a contribution of zero,  t = 0.
It is assumed that the amount of total resources is lower in the pres-
ence of social insurance. This may capture disincentive e¤ects or gov-
ernment ine¢ ciency, which is modeled in a short-cut way for simplicity.
From every unit of contributions collected, the government can only re-
distribute e < 1 units.
The implementation of social insurance by a generation applies to
both periods of the generations life. In the rst period, social insurance
is a waste of resources since agents are still identical and thus pay the
same contributions and receive the same transfer.3 However, in the
second period, social insurance reduces income risk at the price of lower
expected income. Formally, net income xi;t;t of an agent i; t in the rst
period of her life is given by
xi;t;t = 1  (1  e)  t (6)
and net income xi;t;t+1 in the second period of her life is given by
xi;t;t+1 =
(
1   t + (1  t) e t; prob. 1  t
(1  t) e t; prob. t
, (7)
where  t is the contribution implemented by generation t and can be
either one or zero.
Agent i; t faces the following budget constraint in her rst period of
life:
ci;t;t + si;t  xi;t;t. (8)
Thus, consumption and savings may not succeed her net income. In the
second period consumption may not exceed net income plus savings,
ci;t;t+1  xi;t;t+1 + si;t. (9)
3This simplies the analytical solution but does not a¤ect the qualitative results.
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Political choices are decided by direct democracy. Each generation t
decides whether to implement social insurance, i.e.  t = 1, or not, i.e.
 t = 0, by a direct vote over these two opportunities. The vote takes
place in a general, free, and secret ballot. All agents in generation t
participate in this vote. Furthermore, agents vote truthfully and support
their individual expected-utility maximizing  t.4 The vote of agent i of
generation t is denoted by  i;t 2 f0; 1g.
The timing of events is illustrated in Figure 1. Prior to period t,
income risk t for generation t is determined according to the transition
matrix (5). In this period t, an agent of generation t rst receives infor-
mation from the member of her dynasty in generation t 1. Second, she
takes part in the referendum on the implementation of social insurance
of her generation.5 Third, the agent decides whether or not to obtain
complete information on income risk t. Fourth, the agent receives net
income xi;t;t, decides how much to save, and consumes the remaining
part of her income. In the second period of her life, the agent rst be-
queaths information to a member of generation t + 1. After this, she
observes and receives her net income xi;t;t+1, and consumes.
Agents decisions are determined by (potentially perfect) beliefs
about the state of the world. Since agents have the possibility to up-
date their beliefs, one has to distinguish between prior and posterior
beliefs. Posterior and prior beliefs are labeled by di¤erent time indices.
The time index t+ refers to beliefs after the updating decision in pe-
riod t, whereas the time index t refers to the time in period t before
the updating decision. An agents prior belief can be represented by the
probabilities the agent assigns to the two possible states of the world,
phi;t = probi;t

t = 
h

and 1   phi;t = probi;t

t = 
l

, where probi;t []
denotes the probability of the event in the brackets conditional on infor-
mation available to agent i of generation t before the updating decision.
Analogously, phi;t+ = probi;t+

t = 
h

denotes the agents posterior be-
lief. When the agent decides to be attentive, she will know the state
of the world for sure after updating, i.e. phi;t+ = 1 or p
h
i;t+ = 0 then.
By contrast, when the agent decides to be inattentive, then phi;t+ = p
h
i;t
and the posterior belief can take any value between zero and one. The
4Since any single voter has zero mass in this model, I abstain from analyzing
strategic voting behavior and assume "sincere" (Bearse et al. 2009) voting.
5Voting taking place before updating simplies the solution but a¤ects results in
both political regimes symmetrically by increasing political delays by one period.
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Figure 1: The timing of events and beliefs.
timing of the beliefs can be seen from the dashed lines in Figure 1.
3 Individual Decisions
Decisions of an agent depend only on her beliefs phi;t and p
h
i;t+. Thus
agents with identical beliefs make identical decisions. This is the case
because income in the second period of life, which is a source of hetero-
geneity, realizes after all decisions are taken.
Agent i of generation t chooses  i;t 2 f0; 1g, di;t 2 f0; 1g, si;t 2 [0; xi;t]
sequentially such as to maximize (1) subject to (8), (9), and  t =  i;t
capturing the sincerity of the voting decision. At the rst and second
stage, the agent takes into accout optimal subsequent behavior.
From stage to stage, the information set of the agent can change. At
the nal stage, the agent chooses savings based on the (potentially per-
fect) posterior belief phi;t+ and knowing whether there is social insurance.
At the second stage, the agent chooses whether to update information
based on the prior belief phi;t knowing whether there is social insurance.
At the rst stage, the agent decides whether to vote in favor of social
insurance based on the prior belief phi;t. Prior to all decisions, the agent
calculates subjective probabilities of the two states of the world, phi;t
and 1   phi;t, based on the received information. I solve the problem by
backward induction.6
6A detailed derivation of all results can be found in the web appendix to this
paper on the authors research page.
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3.1 Savings decision
When deciding on individual savings, si;t, an agent i of generation t
knows whether her generation has implemented social insurance. Since
the updating decision has already taken place at this stage, the relevant
belief is the posterior belief phi;t+. At this stage, updating costs are
already sunk. The agent seeks to maximize
Ei;t+ eUi;t = Ei;t+ [u (ci;t;t) + u (ci;t;t+1)] , (10)
which denes eUi;t, based on the posterior belief phi;t+ by choosing indi-
vidual savings, si;t, subject to the two period budget constraints (8) and
(9). The rst-order condition for this problem is
u0 (xi;t;t   si;t) = Ei;t+u0 (xi;t;t+1 + si;t) (11)
which is a consumption Euler equation for the product of the rate of
time preference and the gross interest rate being one. Marginal utility
in the rst period equals expected marginal utility in the next period.
In condition (11), xi;t;t+1 is stochastic and can take four values de-
pending on the aggregate state t and the agents individual draw of the
income process, see equation (7) in which  t is known to the agent at
this stage. The agents expected utility depends on the probabilities the
agent assigns to these four scenarios. These subjective probabilities are
combinations of the income probabilities conditional on the state of the
world, h and 1 h or l and 1 l, respectively, and the probabilities
the agent assigns to the two states of the world, phi;t+ and 1 phi;t+. Using
this subjective probability distribution of xi;t;t+1 and period utility (2)
in condition (11) gives optimal savings.
In generations without social insurance, i.e. for  t = 0, savings,
si;tj t=0 =
ei;t+
2
, (12)
depend positively on expected income risk ei;t+ =
 
1  phi;t+
 l+ phi;t+ 
h. When generation t has decided in favor of social insurance, i.e. for
 t = 1, optimal savings are given by
si;tj t=1 =
e  ei;t+
2
(13)
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and, next to income risk, depend on the level of government e¢ ciency e.
It is important that, since e < 1, savings are lower when there is social
insurance. This implies that having better information when choosing
savings has a smaller impact on utility in the presence of social insurance.
Expected indirect utility. At the updating decision, the agent takes
into account the optimal subsequent savings behavior. Therefore it is
useful to determine expected indirect lifetime utility net of updating
costs which is determined by the solution to the optimization problem for
savings. This expected indirect utility is a function of individual beliefs
and the political regime. I denote expected indirect lifetime utility net
of updating costs in the two political regimes by eV  phi;t+ := Ei;t+[eUi;t j
 t = 0] and fW  phi;t+ := Ei;t+[eUi;t j  t = 1], respectively.
When there is no social insurance, i.e.  t = 0, expected indirect
lifetime utility is given by
eV  phi;t+ = 2  2  (  1)ei;t+ +  ei;t+22 (14)
and decreases in expected income risk. In the other political state, i.e.
with social insurance,  t = 1, expected indirect lifetime utility is
fW  phi;t+ = 2e  2e2   (  2e) eei;t+ +  ei;t+2 e22   e2 Ei;t+ (t)2 ,
(15)
where Ei;t+ (t)
2 =
 
l
2
+phi;t+
 
h
2    l2. Here, expected indirect
utility includes an expectation of the squared income risk because also
conditional net incomes in period t+ 1 depend on t, see equation (7).
Three properties of the expected indirect utility functions are impor-
tant for the subsequent analysis. First, both expected indirect utility
functions (14) and (15) are convex in phi;t+,eV 00  phi;t+=  h   l2 > 0, (16)fW 00  phi;t+= e2  h   l2 > 0. (17)
The convexity implies that there are potential gains from updating be-
cause, when knowing t for sure, i.e. phi;t+ = 0 or p
h
i;t+ = 1, agents
can choose the appropriate savings level and thus improve relative to
uncertain income risk.
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Second, fW is less convex than eV , in the sense that fW 00  phi;t+ <eV 00  phi;t+. In the presence of social insurance, agents save less and,
consequently, the impact of an optimal savings decision on utility is
lower. This implies that gains from updating are smaller when there is
social insurance.
Third, there are constellations where agents would prefer social in-
surance only in one state of the world and not in the other, i.e.eV (0) > fW (0) , eV (1) < fW (1) (18)
or eV (0) < fW (0) , eV (1) > fW (1) . (19)
Since the focus of this paper is on changes between political regimes, I
will restrict the analysis to cases where either condition (18) or condition
(19) is satised. It depends on the parameterization whether the agent
is better o¤ with social insurance when income risk is high or when it is
low.7 For the results of the paper, it is irrelevant whether agents prefer
social insurance for high or low levels of income risk as long as they
prefer it in only one of the two states. When condition (18) or (19)
is fullled, there is a unique posterior belief p+ such that the preferred
political system changes when the posterior belief passes p+.
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3.2 Updating decision
The agent will update her information whenever her expected indirect
utility is higher when doing so. The agent enters this stage of the decision
problem with knowledge about the political regime and a prior belief phi;t
about income risk. In both political regimes, the decision whether to
update will depend on the prior belief about income risk. When taking
the updating decision, the agent takes into account optimal subsequent
behavior as reected in eV or fW , respectively.
7Increases in income risk have two counteracting e¤ects on the attractiveness of
social insurance. First, rising income risk increases the probability that the agent
will be a beneciary of the social-insurance system and thus makes this system more
attractive. Second, rising income risk also a¤ects the dependency ratio decreasing
the benets the agent receives if unlucky, thus making social insurance less attractive.
8Since eV and fW are strictly convex, there are at most two intersections between
the two functions. When condition (18) or condition (19) is satised, the number of
intersections between eV and fW on (0; 1) is odd. Together, this implies that the two
functions intersect exactly once on (0; 1).
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Figure 2: Updating decision in the absence of social insurance ( t = 0).
Figure 2 illustrates the solution of the updating decision for the case
of  t = 0. The agent decides whether to update based on her prior
beliefs about income risk, phi;t. When the agent decides not to update,
she will choose a savings level according to her prior belief. Consequently,
the agent will then expect to receive a lifetime utility of eV  phi;t since
phi;t+ = p
h
i;t and di;t = 0.
When the agent decides to be attentive, she will know t for sure
after updating, i.e. phi;t+ = 0 or p
h
i;t+ = 1. The agent will then choose
savings according to the true income risk. However, in case the agent
updates, her lifetime utility is reduced by the updating cost . She
will then receive either eV (0)    or eV (1)   . Prior to updating, the
agent expects to observe t = h with probability phi;t and t = 
l with
probability 1  phi;t. Before updating, the agents thus expects a lifetime
utility level of
 
1  phi;t
  eV (0) + phi;t  eV (1)   in case she updates.
Since eV is convex in phi;t+, there are potential gains from updating.
The agent will decide to update whenever 
1  phi;t
  eV (0) + phi;t  eV (1)  eV  phi;t > . (20)
Updating costs could be that large that condition (20) is never fullled.
However, if there is some phi;t 2 (0; 1) for which condition (20) is fullled,
then there is a unique updating range between p0 and p0, due to the
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strict convexity of eV . Whenever  t = 0 and phi;t 2  p0; p0, the agent
decides to obtain perfect information about income risk.
In the other political regime,  t = 1, the updating decision works
equivalently. Here, the agent updates whenever 
1  phi;t
 fW (0) + phi;t fW (1) fW  phi;t > . (21)
If there is some phi;t 2 (0; 1) for which condition (21) is fullled, then
there is a unique range
 
p1; p1

for which (21) is fullled.
Due to the constant second derivatives of both eV and fW , both up-
dating ranges, if they exist, are symmetric around 1=2. This implies
that p0 = 1  p0 and p1 = 1  p1. This symmetry is the reason why it
is not important whether agents prefer social insurance for high or low
levels of income risk. The length of the range of beliefs for which the
agent remains inattentive depends on the political regime but not on the
specic end of the belief support. For instance, in the presence of social
insurance, the agent chooses not to update for beliefs in
 
0; p1

and for
beliefs in
 
1  p1; 1. Both ranges have length p1.
However, it is important that the updating range is smaller in the
presence of social insurance which is crucial for the di¤erent informa-
tion choices in the two political regimes. This result reects that, when
 t = 1, savings are lower and thus choosing savings based on better in-
formation has a lower inuence on lifetime utility.9 Furthermore, there a
values of the information cost  such that the agent would never update
when social insurance is implemented but sometimes do so when there
is no social insurance.
Expected indirect utility. At the voting stage of the decision prob-
lem, the agent takes into account optimal subsequent behavior including
optimal updating. Therefore, it is useful to determine the expected in-
direct utility function which arises from optimal savings and optimal
updating. I denote this function as V
 
phi;t

:= Ei;t [Ui;t j  t = 0] for the
case of  t = 0 and W
 
phi;t

:= Ei;t [Ui;t j  t = 1] for the case of  t = 1.
9To show this result formally, note that also the di¤erence function eV   fW is
convex in phi;t since eV 00  phi;t > fW 00  phi;t. Thus, the left hand side of (20) is always
larger than the left hand side of (21). Therefore, whenever phi;t fullls condition (21),
condition (20) is also fullled but the reverse does not hold.
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In the absence of social insurance, this function is
V
 
phi;t

=
(eV  phi;t , phi;t =2  p0; p0 
1  phi;t
  eV (0) + phi;t  eV (1)  , phi;t 2  p0; p0 . (22)
Analogously, in the presence of social insurance, expected lifetime utility
as a function of the agents belief is
W
 
phi;t

=
(fW  phi;t , phi;t =2  p1; p1 
1  phi;t
 fW (0) + phi;t fW (1)  , phi;t 2  p1; p1 . (23)
Two expected indirect utility functions V and W fullling condition
(19) are illustrated graphically in Figure 3. V and W have a unique
intersection p on (0; 1). The notion of a political delay implies that a
reform is actually caused by a change in fundamentals. This is ensured
when the expected indirect utility functions V and W intersect in the
updating ranges as depicted in Figure 3.10 Then, a policy reform only
takes place when agents actually observe that the true current state of
the world is di¤erent from the state revealed by their last update.
3.3 Voting decision
At the voting stage stage, the agent decides whether to vote in favor of
social insurance or against it. She takes this choice such as to maximize
expected indirect utility taking into account optimal subsequent updat-
ing and savings as reected in V or W , respectively. At this stage, the
agent has some prior beliefs phi;t about the state of the world.
Since voting for one or the other alternative is costless, the voting
decision is rather simple to determine. The agent votes for the political
system under which expected indirect utility is higher, depending on the
agents prior belief about the state of the world, phi;t. Agent (i; t) votes
in favor of social insurance whenever
W
 
phi;t

> V
 
phi;t

and votes against it when W
 
phi;t

< V
 
phi;t

.
Revisiting the expected indirect utility functions V andW , it follows
that there is a unique p for which the agent is indi¤erent between the
10This is not necessary but possible as illustrated in the web appendix.
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Figure 3: Indirect utility from optimal savings and optimal updating as
a function of the prior belief in the two political regimes,  t = 0 (solid
line) and  t = 1 (dashed line).
two political regimes, see Figure 3. The voting decision is determined
by whether the agents prior belief phi;t is below or above p
. Whether
she votes in favor of social insurance when phi;t > p
 or when phi;t < p

depends on the parametrization. However, the voting decision changes
when the prior belief passes p.
3.4 Belief formation
The prior belief phi;t is a main determinant of the agents subsequent
decisions. Agent i; t receives all information her ancestor i; t  1 had at
the beginning of period t. Agent (i; t  1) in turn received all information
from agent i; t   2 and so on. Consequently, agent i; t knows the time
of her dynastys last update on income risk and what the respective
member observed at that time.
Consider an agent (i; t) whose dynastys last update was in period
t   j. In period t, the probability that income risk is still the same as
at the time of the last update equals the probability that the number of
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state changes between t  j and t is even, given by
prob [t = t j] =
8<:j! (1  )
jPj=2
n=0
(2)
n
((1 ) 2)n
(j 2n)!(2n)! , j even
j! (1  )jP(j 1)=2n=0 (2)n((1 ) 2)n(j 2n)!(2n)! , j odd. (24)
This probability converges towards 1=2 and, since  < 1
2
, it decreases
monotonically in j. This implies that, the longer the time since the last
update, the lower the probability that income risk is still the same.
When, in the period of the dynastys last update, t  j, the state of
the world was bad, the dynastys beliefs evolve according to
phi;t = prob [t = t j] (25)
until the next update, with prob [t = t j] given by equation (24). In
case the state of the world was good in t  j, beliefs evolve as
phi;t = 1  prob [t = t j] (26)
until the next update. Beliefs thus converge (from above or below)
towards 1=2. The speed of convergence is the same for both, equations
(25) and (26). Since phi;t = 1=2 is always in the updating range if such
range exists, beliefs reach the updating range in both political regimes.
Note that explicit updating is not the only source of complete infor-
mation about income risk. Since agents vote truthfully, the outcome of
the referendum in period t is a perfect signal about what agents who
updated in period t   1 observed. When the agent observes an unex-
pected change in the result of the election, this can only be due to the
fact that some agents have observed a change in the state of the world.
This signal is observable for all agents and agentsbeliefs will thus be
identical afterwards. This way, the updating decision will be perfectly
synchronized across the population. As a consequence, all agents within
one generation have identical prior beliefs, phi;t = p
h
t 8i. Since the prior
belief determines all decisions of an agent (income di¤erence realize af-
terwards), also all decisions are taken in an identical way by all agents
within one generation,  i;t =  t, di;t = dt, phi;t+ = p
h
t+, si;t = st 8i.11
11This implies that neither freeriding on the information reected in other agents
behavior nor rational abstentions are relevant as all agents have the same information.
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4 Aggregate Dynamics
4.1 Duration of inattentiveness and political delay
The duration of inattentiveness I () is the time between two updates
and depends on the current political regime described by  . This time
is only nite when, for some prior belief pht , agents decide to update in-
formation or, technically, when an updating range exists for the current
political regime. If an updating range exists, the duration of inatten-
tiveness can be determined as follows. After an updating period t   j,
agentsbeliefs move into the direction of the updating range according
to equations (25) or (26). The speed of this movement is independent of
the state of the world in the previous updating period. In addition, the
distance to the updating range is independent of the state of the world in
the previous updating period since this range is symmetric around 1=2,
i.e. p0 = 1  p0 and p1 = 1  p1. However, the distance to the updating
range does depend on the current political regime since p0 < p1.
In the absence of social insurance, the duration of inattentiveness
I (0) is the time between the last update and the rst period in which
prior beliefs are within
 
p0; 1  p0,
I (0) = min

t 2 N j prob [t = t j] < 1  p0
	
. (27)
Analogously, in the presence of social insurance, the duration of inatten-
tiveness is
I (1) = min

t 2 N j prob [t = t j] < 1  p1
	
. (28)
If p0 and p1 exist, it holds that p0 < p1. Further, if p1 exists, also p0
does but not vice versa. Thus, the duration of inattentiveness is never
longer without social insurance than with social insurance,
I (0)  I (1) . (29)
The political delay is the time between a change in the fundamental
income risk and the implementation of the appropriate policy reform.
This delay then depends on the duration of inattentiveness and the
timing of the change in the fundamental. The maximum delay is the
duration of inattentiveness I and occurs when the change in the fun-
damental happens right after agents have updated. Due to the timing
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of events, the minimum delay is one period and occurs when income
risk changes right before agentsnext update. Since state changes oc-
cur with equal probability each period, all delays between the minimum
and maximum delay are equally likely. The expected political delay is
thus D () = 1
2
(I () + 1), where  indicates the initial political regime.
Since I (0)  I (1), the expected political delay is never longer in the
absence of social insurance than in the presence of it,
D (0)  D (1) . (30)
This result relies on the disincentive e¤ects of social insurance. In the
presence of this welfare-state measure, agents save less and can thus gain
less from information. As a consequence, agents remain inattentive for
longer periods of time. Changes in income risk are then, in expectations,
realized later and reforms have longer delays.
4.2 A numerical illustration
In this section, I illustrate the asymmetric e¤ects of rational inatten-
tiveness in the two political regimes numerically. In order to highlight
the role of the information cost , I present results for di¤erent values
of  holding constant the other parameters of the model. Specically,
I consider the constellation l = 0:3, h = 0:7,  = 4, and e = 0:94.
These parameter values imply that the indirect utility functions V and
W intersect at p = 0:5. Thus political reforms are only implemented
after agents have updated beliefs. Furthermore, I set  = 0:1 implying
that the expected duration of a state of the world is ten periods. Table 1
presents the duration of inattentiveness and the expected political delay
for di¤erent values of the information cost .
To put the absolute level of the information cost  into perspective,
the table also reports  relative to full-information lifetime utility in
the good state without social insurance, =eV (0), and its consumption
equivalent. Columns 4 to 7 report the durations of inattentiveness and
the expected political delays in the two political regimes. Note that
the regime in the parantheses (0; 1) refers to the initial political regime.
Hence, D (0) is the expected delay of an implementation of social insur-
ance and D (1) is the expected delay of a removal of social insurance.
In the rst row of Table 1, information costs are rather small and
amount to only 0:1% of consumption. In this setting, agents nd it op-
timal to update their beliefs in every period in both political regimes.
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information duration of expected
costs inattentiveness political delay
 =eV (0) cons. equ. I (0) I (1) D (0) D (1)
0.0036 0.07% 0.10% 1 1 1.0 1.0
0.0067 0.13% 0.19% 1 2 1.0 1.5
0.0134 0.26% 0.38% 3 4 2.0 2.5
0.0178 0.35% 0.51% 5 15 3.0 8.0
0.0198 0.39% 0.57% 11 1 6.0 1
0.0232 0.45% 0.66% 1 1 1 1
Table 1: Duration of inattentiveness and expected political delay for
di¤erent information costs (l = 0:3, h = 0:7, e = 0:94,  = 4,  = 0:1)
Thus the time between two updates is 1. Consequently, we also ob-
serve the minimum political delay of one period between a change in
fundamentals and the implementation of the appropriate policy reform.
With higher information costs of about 0:2% of consumption, agents
still nd it rational to update every period when there is no social insur-
ance. However, with social insurance, gains from updating are lower and
agents only update every second period. Consequently, a change in in-
come risk justifying the implementation of social insurance is translated
into a policy reform right in the next period. By contrast, removals of
social insurance can have a delay of two periods.
Further increases in the information cost leads to longer durations
of inattentiveness and, in consequence, to longer political delays. Since
gains from updating are always lower in the presence of social insurance,
the duration of inattentiveness and expected political delays are longer in
this political regime. The fourth row of the table summarizes a situation
where the asymmetry in inattentivess and political delays in the two
political regimes in quite pronounced. This situation features relatively
quick implementations of welfare-state measures which are then quite
persistent.
The next to last row of Table 1 presents a scenario where information
costs are such that, without social insurance, agents nd it optimal to
update their beliefs every eleven periods but never update in the presence
of social insurance. In this case, condition (21) is not fullled for any
phi;t 2 [0; 1]. In this scenario, the society implements social insurance
with an expected delay of three periods. Once this political regime is
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implemented, agents decide to be inattentive forever and thus the social
insurance will never be removed independent of the underlying state of
the world. Thus welfare-state persistence is eternal in this scenario.
The same holds in the last row of Table 1. Here, agents are also
completely inattentive in the absence of social insurance. Political re-
forms thus never take place. The economy remains in its initial political
regime forever.
Note that relatively low information costs are su¢ cient to generate
these extreme forms of political persistence. In the scenarios displayed
in the last two rows of Table 1, information costs amount to 0:39%
and 0:45% of lifetime utility under full information in the good state
of the world, respectively, which is equivalent to a loss of less than 1%
of consumption. Reis (2006a) discusses di¤erent parametrizations of his
inattentiveness modell with updating costs ranging from 0:2% to 0:8%
of income. Zbaracki et al. (2004) measure updating and planning costs
of a rm and nd that these costs are roughly 1% of total revenue.
5 Conclusion
This paper has o¤ered an information-based explanation for welfare-
state persistence. The explanation is based on the incentive e¤ects of
the welfare state on attentiveness. The welfare state crowds out private
nancial precautions and this way reduces incentives to be attentive
to developments in economic fundamentals. When the degree of social
insurance is high, people engage little in private nancial activity. Con-
sequently, they remain inattentive to news for longer periods of time.
As a result, it takes long until a change in fundamentals is noticed by
a majority of society and translated into appropriate policies if initial
welfare-state arrangements are pronounced.
References
Agell, J. (2002). On the determinants of labour market institutions: Rent
seeking vs. social insurance. German Economic Review 3 (2), 107135.
Ameriks, J., A. Caplin, and J. Leahy (2003). Wealth accumulation and
the propensity to plan. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (3),
10071047.
Balassone, F., M. Francese, and S. Zotteri (2010). Cyclical asymmetry in
scal variables in the EU. Empirica 37 (4), 381402.
21
Bartels, L. M. (1996). Uninformed votes: Information e¤ects in presidential
elections. American Journal of Political Science 40 (1), 194230.
Bearse, P., B. A. Cardak, G. Glomm, and B. Ravikumar (2009). Why do
education vouchers fail? CAEPR Working Paper 2009-014.
Beetsma, R. M. W. J., A. Cukierman, and M. Giuliodori (2009). The po-
litical economy of redistribution in the U.S. in the aftermath of world
war II and the delayed impacts of the great depression - evidence and
theory. CEPR Discussion Paper 7501.
Bird, E. J. (2001). Does the welfare state induce risk-taking? Journal of
Public Economics 80 (3), 357383.
Blanchard, O. and J. Wolfers (2000). The role of shocks and institutions in
the rise of european unemployment: The aggregate evidence. Economic
Journal 110 (462), C133.
Borck, R. (2007). On the choice of public pensions when income and life
expectancy are correlated. Journal of Public Economic Theory 9 (4),
711725.
Brooks, C. and J. Manza (2006). Why do welfare states persist? Journal
of Politics 68 (4), 816827.
Brügemann, B. (2012). Does employment protection create its own political
support? Journal of the European Economic Association forthcoming.
Bénabou, R. (2000). Unequal societies: Income distribution and the social
contract. American Economic Review 90 (1), 96129.
Carroll, C. D. (2003). Macroeconomic expectations of households and pro-
fessional forecasters. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (1), 269
298.
Cukierman, A. and M. Tommasi (1998). When does it take a nixon to go
to China? American Economic Review 88 (1), 180197.
De Boef, S. and P. M. Kellstedt (2004). The political (and economic) origins
of consumer condence. American Journal of Political Science 48 (4),
633649.
Dhami, S. (2003). The political economy of redistribution under asymmet-
ric information. Journal of Public Economics 87 (9-10), 20692103.
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.
Duch, R. M., H. D. Palmer, and C. J. Anderson (2000). Heterogeneity
in perceptions of national economic conditions. American Journal of
Political Science 44 (4), 635652.
22
Duch, R. M. and R. T. Stevenson (2011). Context and economic expecta-
tions: When do voters get it right? British Journal of Political Sci-
ence 41 (1), 131.
Gavin, M. and R. Perotti (1997). Fiscal policy in Latin America. In NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 1997, Volume 12, pp. 1172.
Haller, H. B. and H. Norpoth (1994). Let the good times roll: The eco-
nomic expectations of U.S. voters. American Journal of Political Sci-
ence 38 (3), 625650.
Hansen, J. W. (2005). Uncertainty and the size of government. Economics
Letters 88 (2), 236242.
Hassler, J., J. V. Rodríguez Mora, K. Storesletten, and F. Zilibotti (2003).
The survival of the welfare state. American Economic Review 93 (1),
87112.
Hassler, J., K. Storesletten, and F. Zilibotti (2007). Democratic public good
provision. Journal of Economic Theory 133 (1), 127151.
Hercowitz, Z. and M. Strawczynski (2004). Cyclical ratcheting in govern-
ment spending: Evidence from the OECD. The Review of Economics
and Statistics 86 (1), 353361.
Jappelli, T. (2010). Economic literacy: An international comparison. Eco-
nomic Journal 120 (548), F429F451.
Laslier, J.-F., A. Trannoy, and K. van der Straeten (2003). Voting under
ignorance of job skills of unemployed: the overtaxation bias. Journal of
Public Economics 87 (3-4), 595626.
Lindbeck, A. (1995). Hazardous welfare-state dynamics. American Eco-
nomic Review, Papers and Proceedings 85(2), 915.
Lindbeck, A. (2003). An essay on welfare state dynamics. CESifo working
paper 976.
Lindbeck, A. and J. Weibull (1999). Social norms and economic incentives
in the welfare state. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1), 135.
Lusardi, A. (1999). Information, expectations, and savings. In H. Aaron
(Ed.), Behavioral Dimensions of Retirement Economics, pp. 81115.
New York: Brookings Institution Press/Russell Sage Foundation.
Mankiw, N. G. and R. Reis (2010). Imperfect information and aggregate
supply. In B. M. Friedman and M. Woodford (Eds.), Handbook of Mon-
etary Economics, Volume 3, pp. 183229. Elsevier.
23
Mankiw, N. G., R. Reis, and J. Wolfers (2003). Disagreement about ina-
tion expectations. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual, pp. 209270.
Myerson, R. B. (1998). Population uncertainty and poisson games. Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory 27 (3), 375392.
Nannestad, P. and M. Paldam (1997). The grievance asymmetry revisited:
A micro study of economic voting in Denmark, 1986-1992. European
Journal of Political Economy 13 (1), 8199.
Reis, R. (2006a). Inattentive consumers. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 53 (8), 17611800.
Reis, R. (2006b). Inattentive producers. Review of Economic Studies 73
(3), 793821.
Roemer, J. (1994). The strategic role of party ideology when voters are
uncertain about how the economy works. American Political Science
Review 88 (2), 327335.
Rust, J. and C. Phelan (1997). How social security and medicare af-
fect retirement behavior in a world of incomplete markets. Economet-
rica 65 (4), 781832.
Saint-Paul, G. (2002). The political economy of employment protection.
Journal of Political Economy 110 (3), 672701.
Schultz, C. (2002). Policy biases with votersuncertainty about the econ-
omy and the government. European Economic Review 46 (3), 487506.
Sims, C. (2003). Implications of rational inattention. Journal of Monetary
Economics 50, 317356.
Tabellini, G. (2000). A positive theory of social security. Scandinavian Jour-
nal of Economics 102 (3), 523545.
Taylor, C. R. and H. Yildirim (2010). Public information and electoral bias.
Games and Economic Behavior 68 (1), 353375.
Zbaracki, M. J., M. Ritson, D. Levy, S. Dutta, and M. Bergen (2004).
Managerial and customer costs of price adjustment: Direct evidence
from industrial markets. The Review of Economics and Statistics 86 (2),
514533.
24
 
 
